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INTRODUCTION
At least since Thomas Jefferson, we understand that democ-racy requires a well-functioning media industry.1 Reporting keeps citizens informed, so they can keep government accountable and 
make informed electoral decisions. A well-functioning media industry is a 
pluralistic and independent one: different sources compete with each other to 
bring the truth to citizens. However, things can go wrong: powerful political or 
economic forces can try to “capture the media” and manipulate public opinion 
in order to subvert democracy. This essay will report plenty of anecdotal and 
systematic evidence for this type of phenomenon.
To avoid the threat of media capture, democracies around the world have 
put in place a number of safeguards. One is free press legislation, which pro-
tects the media against direct government interference. However, there is 
another source of danger. If the media industry becomes highly concentrated, 
powerful media owners could attempt to manipulate public opinion. This 
phenomenon too has been understood since the era of media mogul Ran-
dolph Hearst, 2 who would later serve as one of the inspirations for the titular 
character in Orson Welles’ Citizen Kane. To counter the risks associated with 
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concentration, in the post-World War II period most Western democracies put 
in place media ownership limits. No single media owner could acquire the type 
of power Charles Foster Kane has in Citizen Kane because no single entity would 
be allowed to accumulate stakes in so many media outlets.
However, the safeguards of the post-war period were not designed for the 
Facebook era. They were meant to limit concentration on the media platforms 
that existed then: newspapers, radio, and network television. The objective of 
this essay is to discuss whether and how media plurality rules can be adapted 
to the digital age.
This important and complex issue can be explored from many angles. This 
note will take a political economy approach. The political economy of mass 
media is an interdisciplinary effort of experts in economics and political sci-
ence based on the idea that some phenomena are best understood combining 
the methodologies of the two disciplines.3 This mostly empirical field helps 
us answer interdisciplinary questions that guide the study of media capture: 
Is reporting biased? Does biased reporting affect voting outcomes? Is media 
captured by political and economic interests? Does better reporting reduce 
corruption?
This essay is organized as follows. In Section 1, I will explore the link 
between media concentration and media capture, and why we need to protect 
media plurality. The available empirical evidence highlights the link between 
media capture and media concentration as well as the risks a country faces 
when its media are not independent. In Section 2, I will argue that existing 
media ownership restrictions are toothless and obsolete because they apply 
to traditional platforms only. The problem is those rules are platform-centric: 
they attempt to regulate platforms – television, radio, newspapers, etc. – one 
by one, an impossible task in a world where media platforms are proliferating 
and the borders between them are blurring. In Section 3, I set forth the main 
argument of this note: In order to create effective media plurality defenses 
for the digital age, we must first find a platform-neutral way to define and 
measure media concentration. I discuss the notion of attention shares and 
I apply it to an example. Section 4 is empirical. It reports recent attention 
share information from the United States and 35 other countries. The data 
identifies the most powerful media owners in every country, highlighting the 
continued importance of broadcasting companies and the rise of Facebook. It 
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also highlights the presence of information inequality patterns: the poor and 
the less educated have a more concentrated set of information sources, which 
puts them at a higher risk of manipulation. Section 5 shows how the attention 
share approach can be used to evaluate media ownership, and in particular 
to decide whether a specific media merger should be blocked. The analysis is 
carried out in parallel by using the numerical fictional example from Section 
2 as well as alongside a recent application of the attention share approach to 
a 2017 merger review of the proposed acquisition of Sky by 21st Century Fox in 
the U.K. In Section 6, I conclude by reviewing both the benefits and the limits 
of an attention share approach.
1. THE PROBLEM
Media Concentration and Media Capture
The media is different from other industries. Besides providing consumers with services they value as individuals, like entertain-ment and information, it also supplies a public good that benefits 
us as a society.4 In a modern democracy, the media keeps a nation informed 
about its government. The media helps to inform our votes, providing infor-
mation that leads us to elect (or not) our governing officials. This is a public 
good because its use among an entire citizenry benefits each member of 
that citizenry: I as an individual voter benefit if my fellow voters are better 
informed.5
Jefferson’s hypothesis that the press keeps government accountable 
has recently been tested in a number of empirical studies. Elected poli-
ticians behave better when the media is monitoring them. For example, 
John M. Snyder and David Strömberg found that U.S. representatives from 
districts where media coverage is high are less ideologically extreme, vote 
more frequently against the party leaders, are more likely to stand witness 
before congressional hearings, more likely to serve on constituency-oriented 
committees and less likely to serve on broad policy-oriented committees.6
Note a complexity of testing the prediction that political outcomes 
depend on media quality. It may not be the case that the relationship between 
media quality and outcomes is direct. Rather, they may be spuriously 
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correlated (for instance, areas with higher education levels are likely to have 
both better media and more engagement). The political economy literature 
has devised clever methodologies to overcome this endogeneity problem. 
The idea is to find some independent variation of media coverage to measure 
its causal effect on political outcomes. In their study, Snyder and Strömberg 
studied noncongruent media markets, including areas like Gary, Indiana, 
that belong to a media market (Chicago, Illinois) in a different state. Citizens 
of such an area receive less coverage about their own state’s politicians. 
This positive relation between media coverage and political outcomes 
applies to different media and in different contexts. A study by Timothy 
Besley and Robin Burgess found that, in India between 1958 and 1992, the 
government provided more public food aid and calamity relief to areas with 
higher newspaper readership.7 In Brazil, a study by Claudio Ferraz and 
Frederico Finan found that voters were less likely to re-elect corrupt mayors 
in municipalities with more radio coverage.8 
In these examples, the media acts as an effective watchdog. Where can 
things go wrong? When does the media stop monitoring the government? 
Media owners may be tempted to ally themselves to politicians to manipulate 
public opinion, generating a phenomenon known as media capture.9 Media 
capture brings benefits to both sides of the bargain. The politician finds it 
easier to get elected and to remain in power due to more favorable coverage. 
In exchange, the media owner gets favors from the government, which can 
be financial (the government implements policies that favor the owner's 
economic interests) or ideological (it supports the owner’s viewpoint).
There is abundant evidence that media capture occurs. An analysis of 
Alberto Fujimori’s presidency found direct proof of media capture in Peru: 
detailed records from Fujimori’s security chief, Vladimiro Montesinos, link 
payments made to most of the country’s television networks and newspapers 
to neutral or positive coverage of Fujimori in those media outlets.10 More 
recent forensic evidence comes from a secretly taped conversation in which 
Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu negotiates more positive cover-
age in media mogul Arnon Mozes’s newspaper in exchange for limiting the 
circulation of a rival daily.11
Countries with a long tradition of press independence are not immune 
from capture. In the U.K., the Leveson Inquiry, which reviewed evidence of 
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corruption and leaks involving newspapers, the police, and the press fol-
lowing the News of the World phone hacking scandal, concluded that media 
capture was broader than the case under investigation:
Taken as a whole, the evidence clearly demonstrates that, over the last 30–35 
years and probably much longer, the political parties of U.K. national Govern-
ment and of U.K. official Opposition, have had or developed too close a rela-
tionship with the press in a way which has not been in the public interest.12
What makes media capture more or less likely? In a highly concentrated 
media market, capture is easier because it requires an “understanding” 
between a small number of players. If there are more owners, getting to such 
an agreement becomes harder. Each individual owner faces an incentive to 
remain uncaptured, tell the truth, and gain larger market shares. A simple 
game-theoretic model can illustrate this phenomenon.13,14
The model can be sketched as follows. An incumbent, who can be good 
or bad, is facing re-election. Voters would want to re-elect her if she is good 
and replace her if she is bad. Some hard information may surface that reveals 
the quality of the incumbent. If the information is positive, the incumbent 
has no reason to suppress it. If it’s negative, the incumbent may try to “bribe” 
the media not to publish it. The bribe can be an actual payment as in the 
Peruvian example or a policy favor as in more subtle cases. The media indus-
try comprises n outlets, who could all print the story. A scoop increases the 
revenue and prestige of the outlet who publishes it. The incumbent has a 
limited amount of resources to bribe the media. Will she succeed?
The answer crucially depends on the number of independent media 
outlets n. As every silenced outlet must be compensated for the lost scoop 
revenue, the total bribe amount increases with n. It is more expensive – per-
haps prohibitively so – to silence a media industry with many independent 
owners. This simple model can be extended in many ways, but the key point 
remains: media plurality makes capture less likely.
This prediction is consistent with observed cross-country patterns.15 
The political longevity of the country’s most senior elected official (prime 
minister or president, depending on the constitutional system) increases 
with media concentration (as measured by the share of audience controlled 
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by the top five outlets). The effect is large: for example, the average political 
longevity in countries with “low” concentration (the top five newspapers 
control less than 75% of the audience) is around five years; longevity in 
countries with “high” concentration is over ten years.16
2. WHY THE EXISTING RULES ARE NOT ENOUGH
We have just seen that media capture damages the democratic system, and that it is more likely to happen in concentrated media systems. The most obvious defense against capture is, 
thus, to maintain media plurality. That is why most Western democracies 
have put in place rules to prevent concentration buildup in the media indus-
try. This section will review the existing rules and argue that they are no 
longer adequate because innovation in communication technology has 
radically changed the media landscape.
Most countries in Europe and North America have media ownership 
restrictions. For decades, the U.S. has had limits on local television and radio 
ownership, on radio/television cross-ownership, and newspaper/broadcast 
cross-ownership. Those rules cover the three traditional platforms: televi-
sion, radio, and the press. They worked relatively well when those – and 
specifically network television – were the dominant platform. De facto, they 
prevented mergers between the three national networks: ABC, CBS, and NBC. 
However, technology has changed. New communication channels have 
been introduced: cable, the internet, mobile technologies, etc. New news 
platforms have flourished: cable news channels, online-only sources, social 
media, etc. The second-most important single source of news in the U.S. in 
2017 was Facebook, which is also one of the top three sources in at least 12 
other countries.17 Legacy media is now available on multiple platforms. I can 
read my newspaper in print, on my desktop, on my Kindle, on my phone, etc. 
This makes the existing platform-centric regulation obsolete. Modern 
digital media is totally exempt from it and could conceivably merge with large 
traditional sources. Nothing in FCC ownership rules prevents Facebook, the 
second largest U.S. news source, from buying the largest one: Fox News.
Regulators and scholars are well aware of this issue. There have been two 
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reactions to it. One is to try to modernize the existing ownership restriction 
system. The other is to argue that media-specific ownership restrictions are 
unnecessary because media plurality is now protected by standard antitrust 
policy. Let me consider these in turn.
In 2003, the FCC attempted to reform the system by introducing the 
Diversity Index.18 The index considered four news platforms: television, 
radio, newspapers, and the internet. Based on Nielsen data, each platform 
was assigned a weight according to its prevalence: television 33.8%, radio 
24.9%, newspapers 28.8%, the internet 12.5%. Within each media market, 
the index would count the number of “voices” on each platform; one radio 
station counted as one voice. Each voice would be assigned a weight equal to 
1 over the number of voices in that platform in that media market multiplied 
by the platform weight. For instance, if there were five radio stations in that 
market, each station would get a weight of one-fifth of 24.9%, for a final value 
of 4.98%. Each media owner would be assigned a total weight equal to the 
sum of the weights of all the voices they owned.
The Diversity Index recognized the importance of aggregating concen-
tration across platforms. It also had the merit of seeking an objective way of 
performing this aggregation. However, it also had at least three serious flaws. 
First, it gave the same weight to each voice on the same platform in the same 
market. For example, in the New York City market, The New York Times and 
the Staten Island Advance would carry the same weight. Second, it did not 
consider overlaps between audiences: even if we look at two “voices” with 
the same audience size, one may be the exclusive source of information for 
certain people, while another one may be used by people who also access 
many other sources – a crucial factor in determining the weight of a voice 
(more about that later on). Third, even if all voices had the same audience 
and all audiences had the same number of voices, we are still left with the 
problem that some voices provide a lot of political information while other 
voices provide little or no news: If the risk is media capture, we are more 
worried about someone who owns two news channels than someone who 
owns two general channels. Indeed, the Diversity Index was struck down 
by the courts. Though the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit did not 
object to the general goal of the approach, it rejected the index because it 
employed “several irrational assumptions and inconsistencies.”19
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The next section can be seen as an attempt to construct a new version 
of the Diversity Index starting from first principles. But for now, let us focus 
on the second possible response to the obsolescence of traditional media 
ownership restrictions.
One could argue that specific antitrust rules for the media are not neces-
sary because we can rely on general antitrust legislation. The U.S. and most 
other Western democracies have rules and institutions to protect consumers 
against monopolies. In particular, they have a merger review process to 
prevent individual owners from accumulating too much market power. So 
why not simply use standard competition policy to protect media plurality?
The problem, as a number of scholars and regulatory bodies have 
pointed out, is that competition policy is meant to protect consumer wel-
fare, not media plurality.20 The two are very different. As we argued above, 
media plurality protects a public good: effective and independent political 
reporting as a predicate for a healthy democracy. Consumer welfare typically 
considers the prices paid by individual consumers. A standard merger review 
will typically block the transaction if the new entity will accumulate exces-
sive market power — typically identified when a merger is likely to increase 
prices for consumers.
Because they have different goals, consumer welfare and news plurality 
define concentration in radically different ways. For consumer welfare, con-
centration is defined on a market: a set of firms that are competing directly 
with each other, namely firms whose cross-price elasticity is nonzero (we are 
in the same market if, when I lower my prices, your firm will sell less). For 
news plurality, the relevant set of firms is news producers. A media market 
can be larger or smaller than the set of news producers.
An example of a media market that is larger than the set of news produc-
ers is television: television providers compete with each other, but the vast 
majority of them are not news producers. A merger of two television compa-
nies, one of which does not do news, may reduce consumer welfare (price) 
but does not affect news plurality. Problematically, current price-oriented 
competition policy tends not to burden itself with mergers involving pure 
television news channels, because those are typically small fish in the large 
television pond (the big fish being entertainment providers).
An example of a news organization that straddles markets is a company 
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that owns both a newspaper and a news channel. The cross-price elasticity 
between the newspaper and the news channel is either zero (if you consider 
subscription price) or very low (if you consider the overall effect on the 
massive advertising market). So, their merger is typically a nonevent from 
a competition policy perspective. However, they both belong to the set of 
news producers and hence a merger may significantly reduce news plurality. 
Competition policy is therefore too lenient in two crucial cases: news 
providers that operate on platforms that provide mainly entertainment (like 
television and the internet) and news providers that operate on different 
platforms. Section 5 will revisit this point with an example of a new approach 
to merger review: The 2017 proposed 21st Century Fox-Sky merger posed no 
risk to consumer welfare but was instead blocked on a pure news plurality 
ground. 
As last year’s report from the Stigler Commission on Digital Platforms 
argued, media mergers should require two parallel reviews: a standard 
competition policy review to protect consumer welfare and a yet-to-be-de-
termined news plurality review meant to protect us as citizens.21 The next 
two sections attempt to define and measure news plurality.
3. MEASURING CONCENTRATION 
Attention Share
This section proposes one theoretically grounded way to mea-sure news plurality.22 I am in no way implying that this is the only way or the best way. But I see two positives. First, it is built from first 
principles, and we can therefore assess whether those are the right founda-
tions for such an index. If we disagree with the foundations, we can propose 
new measures. Second, it is relatively simple and it can be computed – with 
some degree of approximation – on the basis of existing data, something I 
will do in the next section. 
For now, let us build the measure by means of a numerical example. 
The hypothetical country in Figure 1 has 20 million citizens. The table rep-
resents their news consumption patterns. There are three news platforms: 
television, the press, and new media. Each platform has two providers. Figure 
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1 represents news consumption patterns. There are 10 million citizens in 
Segment 1 and each of them spends one hour a week watching news on one 
of the two TV channels (TV1). Citizens in Segment 2 (5 million) spend one 
hour a week watching TV2 and another hour a week reading NP1. Citizens 
in the last segment (5 million as well) use four news sources and spend one 
hour on each source.
The standard measures that are reported include an “absolute audience 
number” measure and a “relative platform share” measure (e.g., “newspaper 
circulation” or “television ratings”). This example has been designed so that 
the absolute audience number is the same for the two sources within every 
platform and the relative platform share number is the same for each of the 
six sources. 
These aggregate figures are therefore quite “symmetric.” If you look at 
them without knowledge of the underlying news consumption metric, you 
would have no idea that the figures hide a highly skewed situation. One of 
these six sources is very different: TV1 is the monopolist news provider for 
half of the population in our fictional country. TV1 is extremely dangerous 
from a media capture perspective: it is in a much better position to manipu-
late voters as its consumers do not receive information from other sources.
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Figure 1. Example of an Attention Share Measure of Media Concentration
Television Press New Media
TV2 TV1 NP1 NP2 NM1 NM2
Segment 1 (10 
milli0n people)
1 hour - - - - -
Segment 2 (5 
million people)
- 1 hour 1 hour - - - 
Segment 3 (5 
million people)
- 1 hour - 1 hour 1 hour 1 hour
Audience 
number
10 million 10 million 5 million 5 million 5 million 5 million
Platform Share 1/2 1/2 1/2 1/2 1/2 1/2
Segment 1's 
attention share
100% - - - - -
Segment 2's 
attention share
- 50% 50% - - -
Segment 3's 
attention share
- 25% - 25% 25% 25%
Attention Share 50% 18.75% 12.5% 6.25% 6.25% 6.25%
This example highlights the limits of standard concentration measures, 
like television ratings or newspaper circulation, that are platform-centric: 
they tell us what happens on one platform. We can learn whether there is 
concentration on that specific platform, but that information is of limited 
use in situations like Figure 1.
In my previous work, I propose starting from the most granular level of 
analysis: news consumption by each individual voter.23 For each voter – or 
for a statistically representative sample of them – we can ask: Where does 
this person get her political news? And as Thomas Jefferson might ask: Who 
provides individual voters with the information they need to keep politicians 
accountable?
Once we have that granular information, we will aggregate not within 
platforms or markets, as it is done traditionally, but across voters, thus going 
from “Who provides individual voters with the information they need to 
keep politicians accountable?” to “Who provides the electorate with the 
13MEASURING AND PROTECTING MEDIA PLURALITY IN THE DIGITAL AGE
information they need to keep politicians accountable?” In a good media 
system, it is a large number of independent sources. In a bad system it is 
a small number of powerful people who are friends with the government.
Person-centric concentration measures face a number of conceptual 
and practical hurdles. Let me propose the simplest one I can think of. The 
starting point for this simple measure is a news consumption matrix such as 
that in Figure 1. Suppose we know from surveys and/or direct usage analysis 
where a set of voters gets its political news. For each voter i, let his denote the 
amount of attention that i devotes to news source s. This can be measured 
in many ways: one possible unit is time as in Figure 1, in which case his is the 
number of hours per week the voter spends on that source.
Next, let us turn absolute attention into relative attention. If Hi is the 
total attention our voter devotes to all sources, the relative attention she 
devotes to source s is:
In the attention-as-time interpretation ais is telling us what percentage 
of i’s media time is devoted to source s. In Figure 1, for instance, people in 
Segment 1 devote all their attention to TV1 while people in Segment 2 only 
devote half of their attention to TV2.
The final step consists in aggregating attention shares across voters. 
Suppose there are N voters. The (total) attention share A of source s is the sum 
of attention shares across voters, divided by the number of voters:
For instance, TV1 has a 100% attention share over 10 million voters and 
a 0% attention share over the remaining 10 million. Thus, its (total) attention 
share ATV1 is 50%, as reported in the bottom row of Figure 1. 
Unlike the other metrics – raw audience numbers and market shares – 
attention share captures the skewness of consumption patterns: Though TV1 
and TV2 have an equal number of viewers, TV1’s attention share is a whop-
ping 50%, and TV2’s is only 18.75% because TV2’s viewers also consume news 
through other platforms. Additionally, NP2, NM1, and NM2 each command 
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only one-sixteenth of the attention (6.25%), though they each reach half of 
the amount of consumers as the TV platforms. 
Attention share As can be seen as a measure of the source s’s potential 
to manipulate political elections by characterizing the relation between an 
outlet’s attention share and the maximum vote share the outlet can hope to 
swing.24 An extremely simple case is when every voter can be vulnerable to 
manipulation (“naïve”) with probability m of voters or immune to manipula-
tion with probability 1-m. To make things even simpler, assume a naïve voter 
follows the advice of one of the sources he follows at random. 
In this ultrasimple scenario, the probability that source s – should it 
wish to do so – successfully manipulates voter i is that voter’s attention share 
ais multiplied by the naïveté probability m. As a result, the total vote share 
source s controls is simply mAs. The maximum vote share a source can swing 
is given by its attention share times the naïveté share.25
4. ATTENTION SHARES IN PRACTICE
How can attention shares be computed in practice?26 One needs news diet information similar to that of Figure 1. Namely, one needs to know, for a representative set of citizens, where they 
get their political information. Datasets that only cover a subset of platforms 
are not appropriate. For instance, computer usage information may have 
information about news consumption on electronic devices but does not tell 
us about newspaper reading and television watching. Similarly, standard 
television surveys do not tell us about news consumption on other platforms. 
One needs a dataset that covers all news sources.
In a study we published last year,27 Patrick J. Kennedy and I relied on 
an online survey run by the Reuters Institute for the Study of Journalism 
(RISJ).28 In January and February of 2017, RISJ contracted with the polling 
firm YouGov to conduct a series of international internet surveys for their 
annual Digital News Report. All together, these surveys cover more than 
72,000 individuals in 36 countries. 
  The survey asks: “Which, if any, of the following sources have you used 
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to access news in the last week? Please select all that apply.” An extensive 
list of potential sources is tailored to each country, and the choice ordering 
is randomized for each respondent. The question is repeated to distinguish 
between traditional media platforms (television, radio, and print), online 
platforms (web, mobile, tablet, or e-reader), and social media platforms 
(such as Facebook and Twitter). Unfortunately, the survey does not ask how 
much time the respondent devotes to each source, so we can only assume 
equal time for each source. 
The same source can be accessed offline (a copy of The New York Times) 
or electronically (New York Times app or nytimes.com). We merge all modes 
of access. Because we are ultimately interested in media ownership, sources 
are grouped according to parent companies when applicable. For instance, 
Fox News and the Wall Street Journal are grouped under News Corp to cap-
ture their shared majority ownership by the Murdoch family.
Before discussing the results, let me highlight three important data 
limitations. First, the data does not have information about the amount of 
time users devote to sources in the baseline tables presented; source usage 
is assumed to be constant across sources. If a consumer uses three sources, 
we assume she devotes one-third of her attention to each of them. While 
quantitative time information is ideal, earlier research provides qualitative 
information about usage frequency (“regularly”, “sometimes”, “hardly ever” 
or “never”).29 Attention shares are roughly similar if one chooses “regularly” 
or “sometimes.”
Second, no systematic evidence exists to determine whether the same 
attention devoted to different sources may yield different amounts of infor-
mation. For example, we may consider reading a newspaper to be intrinsi-
cally more informative than watching television, but current research does 
not provide a way to calculate this effectively. I therefore assume that equal 
time yields equal amounts of information. 
Finally, while the editorial process is transparent on traditional plat-
forms – news stories are selected by an editorial hierarchy – it is sometimes 
opaque or decentralized on new platforms. The selection of news stories I 
see on my Facebook account is partly under my control, partly determined 
by my connections, and partly determined by a secret Facebook algorithm. 
So, while we can compare attention shares devoted to different platforms, 
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we should be extremely cautious in interpreting them.
Figure 2 reports the results of our exercise for the United States.30 The 
top ten positions comprise:
• 5 television-based news providers: News Corp,31 CNN, Comcast,32 
ABC, and CBS.
• 3 new media companies: Facebook, Yahoo, and the Huffington Post.
• 1 newspaper: The New York Times.
• 1 radio network: NPR.
Figure 2. Attention Share in the U.s., 201733
The first striking fact is that television and new media are the domi-
nant platforms while traditional print journalism is almost absent. This is 
mostly due to a broad news consumption pattern. In the U.S. over 60% of 
respondents uses a television news source, while less than 30% of them use 
an online print source. This pattern is found in most of the 36 countries in 
our sample. The average television penetration is over 70%, while print is 
around 40%.34
To have a sense of who the dominant players are, one can take the three 
highest ranked news providers according to our measure. In the U.S., it 
would be News Corp, Facebook, and CNN – therefore comprising two mainly 
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pattern. If we look at the other 35 countries, in all of them at least one of the 
top-three players is TV-based, and in 31 of the 35 countries, at least two of the 
top-three players are TV-based. Facebook scores high among non-TV-based 
companies: It is in the top-three list in 12 countries outside of the United 
States (Argentina, Austria, Brazil, Canada, Chile, Czech Republic, Greece, 
Hungary, Malaysia, Romania, Singapore, Turkey). No other news company 
has as much international reach as Facebook. 
New media can be subdivided into three categories: internet-only 
sources (like the Huffington Post), traditional print/TV/radio sources with 
an online presence (like the online/app versions of The New York Times or 
Fox News), and social media. Internet-only sources play a relatively limited 
role. In most countries, the online version of traditional sources plays a more 
important role, with an average penetration rate around 60%. The U.S. is 
somewhat of an outlier: its traditional media have a lower online presence, 
while pure internet sources seem to be doing better than in other countries.
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Another important pattern that emerges relates to information inequal-
ity. Some people get their news from many sources while others use a very 
small number of sources. Information inequality is an important factor in our 
approach to media concentration. Suppose Alice and Bob both get their news 
from source S, but Alice also uses nine other sources while Bob only accesses 
S. If S is trying to manipulate the views of its users, we may hypothesize that 
it is more likely to be successful with Bob, who is information-poor, than 
Alice, who can cross-check her information with her other sources. As I will 
argue later, we should be more worried about media mergers that involve 
companies with information-poor users.
Our work also attempted to identify which socioeconomic variables drive 
information inequality. We found that older people, women, low earners, and 
people who did not go to college tend to access a smaller number of sources.36 
Right-wing people also appear to use fewer sources.37 
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The number of news sources, expressed as a deviation from the national mean, accord-
ing to personal characteristics. First calculated in Kennedy & Prat, the gure is based on 
results accounting for all 36 countries surveyed in the Reuters Institute for the Study of 
Journalism’s Digital News Report 2017. 
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The individual-level link between income and information that we saw 
in Figure 4 translates into a country-level relation between income inequality 
and information inequality. If rich people tend to have many sources and 
poor people tend to have few sources, a country with an unequal income 
distribution will tend to have an unequal information distribution, too. For 
both variables, we use the same inequality measure – the Gini index – which 
takes a value of zero if all citizens in a country have equal income (or use an 
equal number of sources) and a value of 1 in the case of perfect inequality. 
Gini is a standard measure of income inequality; we extend its application 
to information. 
Figure 4 plots the income inequality index and the information inequal-
ity index of every high-income country39 in the sample. As the fitted regres-
sion line shows, there is a strong relationship between the two. At the bottom 
left, Finland displays a relatively equal income distribution and a relatively 
equal information distribution. At the top right, U.S. citizens are the most 
unequal both in terms of income and number of sources. 



























The relationship between income inequality and information inequality for 18 OECD member coun-
tries with high internet penetration rates (greater than 85%). The income Gini metric is pulled from 
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Figure 5 is of course just a correlation. Income inequality may be causing 
information inequality, as hypothesized above. But causality may also run 
in the opposite direction. As we saw in Section 2, there is evidence that the 
political system discriminates against voters with less information. In the 
long term, that discrimination may keep them poor. Information inequality 
can lead to political inequality and eventually economic inequality.41
5. TOWARD A NEW MEDIA MERGER POLICY
Now that we have defined attention shares theoretically and explored their empirical patterns, let us discuss how they can be used to protect news plurality.
To illustrate the issues at stake, this section will develop two examples 
in parallel. The first is based on the fictional country in Figure 1: we are going 
to look at a merger between TV1 and NM1 and see how the different metrics 
record the increase in concentration. 
The second example is real: the 2017 proposed acquisition of Sky (a Euro-
pean television company with a sizeable news operation) by 21st Century Fox 
(a company owned by Rupert Murdoch). The proposed merger would have 
arguably led to concentration in the U.K. news market as Rupert Murdoch’s 
News Corp also owns two British newspapers with both print and digital 
platforms, The Times and The Sun. 
In the first part of this section, we will analyze how current competition 
policy, based on the consumer welfare standard, acts in these two examples. 
In the second part, we see how it would act under a broader citizen welfare 
standard that prioritizes media pluralism. 
Let us begin with the fictional merger. Current competition policy would 
not have much to say about the TV1-NM1 transaction. There are two cases 
depending on whether TV1 and NM1 derive their revenues purely from 
advertising or also partly from subscriptions. If they both follow a subscrip-
tion model, the merger review could try to argue that the merger is likely to 
increase the prices they charge consumers. However, because the two compa-
nies operate in different markets (television and online), cross-price elasticity 
is likely to be negligible and the threat of higher prices quickly written off. 
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If they instead derive revenue from advertising, one could try to argue that 
the merged entity will have a greater market power vis-a-vis advertisers, and 
this will lead to higher ad prices that may hurt consumers. This argument 
is unlikely to work in practice for the advertising market because of its vast 
scale and the relatively tiny piece of it that the news industry comprises; 
entertainment and sports are much more important from an advertising 
revenue standpoint. Also, the effect on consumers is indirect, and one would 
have to prove not just that there will be an effect on ad supply but that the 
effect will hurt consumers. A similar argument that the merged entity will 
have greater market power vis-a-vis content providers is also unlikely to work 
because different platforms are unlikely to compete for the same content.
Now, consider the 2017 proposed acquisition of Sky by 21st Century Fox 
in the U.K. As this merger involved a company with operations in multiple 
countries, the merger review was carried out by the European Commission, 
who cleared the merger. Their rationale was that the merging companies 
are mainly active at different levels of the market, and so their assessment 
focused on whether, as a result of the proposed transaction:
• Fox would be able to prevent or significantly limit access by Sky’s com-
petitors to its films and other TV content, as well as to its TV channels. 
The Commission concluded that these possible concerns were not 
founded. This is because the parties’ audience shares remain limited 
and pay-TV distributors would continue to have access to content from 
Fox’s competitors and alternative channels with comparable program-
ming and audiences in the relevant Member States.
• Sky would be incentivized to cease purchasing content from Fox’s 
competitors. The Commission found that this was unlikely as it would 
reduce the quality of Sky’s product offering.
• Sky could prevent competing channels from accessing its platform. 
The investigation found that the merged companies’ ability to shut 
out Fox’s rivals was significantly mitigated by existing regulations in 
the U.K., Germany, and Austria. In addition, competitors that could 
have been targeted for exclusion are either contractually protected for 
a sufficient period of time or are not dependent on Sky’s retail platform 
in the relevant Member States.
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Based on the results of its market investigation, the Commission con-
cluded that the proposed transaction would raise no competition concerns.42
As the two examples illustrate, the consumer welfare criterion may be 
insufficient for evaluating the full impact of mergers between news providers. 
What can be done instead?
For the fictional TV1-NM1 case, one can look at the effect on attention 
shares. The effect of a merger is easy to compute: the attention share of the 
new entity is equal to the sum of the shares of the merging entities. As TV1 
had a 50% share and NM1 had a 6.25% share, the new company would have 
a 56.25% share. Given that TV1 already has the largest attention share, it is 
easy to argue that the new company would have an even larger potential to 
manipulate the democratic process in our fictional country.
To account for this effect, the Stigler Committee proposed a parallel 
merger review. Every merger between media companies would be assessed 
according to two standards:
 
1. A regular competition policy merger review: This would assess the 
potential damage to consumer welfare. This would be the same as the 
current review and would be performed by the relevant competition 
authority.
2. A media plurality review: This would assess the potential damage to 
the democratic process in terms of excessive concentration of attention 
shares in the hands of one owner. An attention share threshold appli-
cable to the proposed merged entity would trigger a plurality review.43  
To see how this might work in practice, let us return to the Sky-21st Cen-
tury Fox merger. In its April 2017 decision allowing the merger after a com-
petition policy review, the European Commission noted that:
The Commission has exclusive jurisdiction to assess the impact of the pro-
posed transaction on competition in the various markets affected within the 
European Economic Area. However, Article 21 of the EU Merger Regulation 
recognises that Member States may take appropriate measures, including 
prohibiting proposed transactions, to protect other legitimate interests, 
such as media plurality.44
24 KNIGHT FIRST AMENDMENT INSTITUTE
The purpose of, and legal frameworks for, competition assessments and 
media plurality assessments are very different. The competition rules focus 
broadly on whether consumers would be faced with higher prices or reduced 
innovation as a result of a transaction. A media plurality assessment typically 
looks at wider concerns about whether the number, range, and variety of 
persons with control of media enterprises is sufficiently diverse.
Shortly before the European Commission’s decision, the U.K. Secretary 
of State for Culture, Media and Sport issued a European intervention notice 
requiring the relevant U.K. authorities to investigate and report on whether 
the proposed transaction is, or may be, against the public interest.45 The 
Secretary of State asked the Competition and Markets Authority (CMA) to 
carry out a review to determine “whether, taking account only of the media 
plurality consideration and the broadcasting standards consideration con-
cerned, the creation of that situation may be expected to operate against 
the public interest.”46 Note that the relevant standard set out was the public 
interest rather than consumer welfare.
The CMA’s review found that the proposed transaction “may be expected 
to operate against the public interest taking account of the need, in relation 
to every different audience in the U.K. or in a particular area or locality of the 
U.K., for there to be a sufficient plurality of persons with control of the media 
enterprises serving that audience (the media plurality consideration).”47 The 
CMA recommended that the merger should be allowed only if 21st Century 
Fox was going to divest the whole of Sky News – a draconian remedy. The 
merger was never finalized.
The CMA arrived at its conclusion through an empirical analysis of the 
attention shares of the merging entities. According to the stated objective, 
“The media plurality consideration seeks to guard against the control of 
media enterprises being overly concentrated in the hands of a limited num-
ber of persons and the fact that it would be a concern for any one person to 
control too much of the media.”48 
For its empirical assessment, the CMA used Ofcom’s 2016 News Con-
sumption Survey (NCS) based on interviews with 2,894 U.K. residents.49 
Like the survey50 from RISJ used in Kennedy and my research, NCS asked 
which news sources respondents use. One difference is that RISJ suggests 
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a specific timeframe (“last week”) while NCS is more vague (“nowadays”). 
Another difference is that RISJ uses an online questionnaire while NCS relies 
on face-to-face interviews.51
Figure 6 reports the values of the attention shares used in the CMA 
review of the Sky-21st Century Fox merger. The two merging entities, Sky and 
News Corp, currently command approximately 6% and 3% of overall atten-
tion for news in the U.K., respectively. This puts Sky in the fourth position 
after BBC, ITN, and Facebook, and News Corp in the eighth position. If the 
merger was allowed, the new entity would have an approximate attention 
share of 10% and be in the third position after BBC and ITN. However, the 
CMA noted that these two organizations have different structures compared 
to Sky and News Corp. BBC’s funding structure and governance place special 
constraints on it to be impartial and ITN is composed of three channels (ITV, 
Channel 4, and Channel 5) that enjoy editorial separation.  































































































































The share of reference of news sources in the UK as presented by the Competition and Markets Authori-
ty, calculated using Ofcom’s measurement framework (an alternative measure to the author’s attention 
share model for assessing media consumption) and survey ndings from its News Consumption in the 
UK: 2016.
*News Corp and 21st Century 
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6. CONCLUSION
This essay has argued that media is central to the democratic system but it is also vulnerable to capture. The risk of capture can be reduced by ensuring that the media industry remains relatively 
unconcentrated. The traditional platform-centric media ownership limits 
have lost their effectiveness and need to be replaced by platform-neutral 
rules that can adapt to a growing set of platforms with blurred boundaries. 
Standard competition policy is also inadequate. We need to rethink how to 
measure and protect media plurality.
One possible platform-neutral media concentration measure is attention 
share. It attempts to capture the importance of each media organization 
in delivering news to voters and it can be computed from existing news 
consumption data. A study of attention shares in 36 countries reveals some 
global patterns: the presence of powerful media owners who tend to be 
traditional broadcasting companies or social media, as well as a degree of 
information inequality among voters that is explained by sociodemographic 
factors. Attention share indices can be part of the review of media merger 
cases, as illustrated theoretically and through a recent U.K. decision. 
It is urgent that we strengthen media plurality defenses and that we 
adapt them to the digital age. This note has argued that this is not an impossi-
ble task: there is at least one way to define and operationalize news plurality 
and use it to enforce ownership limits. 
However, this is just one safeguard against media capture. We should 
conclude by pointing out that there are other important policy questions 
about media ownership that require our attention.
First, even the strictest ownership limits cannot prevent a sufficiently 
powerful autocrat from capturing the media industry. Besides putting limits 
on how much media one individual owner can acquire, we might want to 
introduce conflict of interest rules. Most private media organizations are 
owned by powerful families with large industrial interests.52 For those own-
ers, the potential profit from selling news is swamped by the prospective 
profits of their other financial interests: someone who owns a car manufac-
turer and a newspaper typically has much more at stake financially from the 
former than the latter. They may therefore be tempted to use their newspaper 
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as a way to curry policy favors from the government, like car import tariffs in 
exchange for favorable coverage. We must find ways to either restrict this type 
of ownership or impose effective governance safeguards against potential 
conflict of interest.
Second, we should reignite the debate on how to deal with the public 
good nature of political news. The information inequality analysis in Sec-
tion 4 highlights the presence of a large gap between a privileged minority 
that accesses a large range of high-quality outlets and an information-poor 
majority. The digital age is making this gap worse: those who are not willing 
to pay for subscription-based news are at the mercy of lesser-quality, easily 
manipulated news sources. Given the public nature of political information, 
it makes sense to invest to reduce this gap – just like we invest in public 
education and public health. The traditional solution to this problem – in 
all large Western democracies but the U.S. – is a well-funded public sector 
broadcaster. Additionally, a media voucher system is among many proposed 
solutions that we can consider.53 
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